What A Bloody Awful Country: Northern Ireland’s century of division($14.99Value)

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“For God’s sake, bring me a large Scotch. What a bloody awful country!” Home Secretary Reginald Maudling, returning from his first visit to Northern Ireland in 1970 As a long and bloody guerrilla war staggered to a close on the island of Ireland, Britain beat a retreat from all but a small portion of the country – and thus, in 1921, Northern Ireland was born. That partition, says Kevin Meagher, has been an unmitigated disaster for Nationalists and Unionists alike. Following the fraught history of British rule in Ireland, a better future was there for the taking but was lost amid political paralysis, while the resulting fifty years of devolution succeeded only in creating a brooding sectarian stalemate that exploded into the Troubles. In a stark but reasoned critique, Meagher traces the landmark events in Northern Ireland’s century of existence, exploring the missed signals, the turning points, the principled decisions that should have been taken, as well as the raw realpolitik of how Northern Ireland has been governed over the past 100 years. Thoughtful and sometimes provocative, What a Bloody Awful Country reflects on how both Loyalists and Republicans might have played their cards differently and, ultimately, how the actions of successive British governments have amounted to a masterclass in failed statecraft. “A timely and lucid analysis of the Troubles that asks hard questions of successive British governments. The good news for the current government is that it also offers some answers.” Rory Carroll , The Guardian “A gripping appraisal of Northern Ireland’s turbulent first century. Essential reading for anyone who wants to understand how we have got to where we are today.” Suzanne Breen , Belfast Telegraph Kevin Meagher is associate editor of the political blog, Labour Uncut and a former special advisor to Rt Hon. Shaun Woodward, the most recent Labour Northern Ireland Secretary. He works as a political and communications consultant and has written for a range of publications including the New Statesman and The Independent . There are already lots of books about Northern Ireland and, I dare say, a few more will be published about its centenary to add to the groaning bookshelves. Historians, political scientists, journalists, activists and even participants in the country’s thirty-year ‘Troubles’ have all had their say. For a place where political dialogue has often been lacking, there is no shortage of brilliant and insightful writing already out there, covering every twist and turn of the past century. Rather than re-tread the footsteps of so many eminent chroniclers of Northern Ire land’s past, what I have attempted to do in this book is highlight some of the significant events as I see them, particularly from the British point of view. I will explore the missed signals, the turning points, the principled decisions that, at various stages, should have been taken, as well as the raw realpolitik of how Northern Ireland was governed over the past 100 years. As I see it, there are three key viewpoints that are worthy of examination. First, the Unionists. They oversaw Northern Ire land, uninterrupted, for fifty years, from 1921 until 1972; at which point, Northern Ireland’s idiosyncratic experiment with devolution was curtailed. The place was created in their image to lock in a Protestant–Unionist hegemony. They circled the waggons early on and froze the Catholic minority out. But what might they have done differently, in, say, responding more imaginatively to the civil rights movement of the mid- to late 1960s, which was trying to get a fair deal for Catholics? Why have Unionists failed time after time to initiate a dialogue – to stretch out the hand to Catholic–Nationalists – and by doing so, try to create a level playing field that might have helped head off demands for Irish unity and thus secure the long-term future of the Union? What more could mainstream Unionism have done in facing down the threat from within – namely the rank sectarianism of Loyalists – whipped up by Ian Paisley during that time? I am also interested in the tactics used by Nationalists and Republicans. How might they have played their cards differently? Could they have been more adept at navigating Unionist politics in the 1960s, better utilising the window of opportunity represented by Prime Minister Terence O’Neill and his attempt to steer the Unionist state in a more moderate direction? Might peaceful, direct action have ultimately been more fruitful than armed resistance and shortened the Troubles, or avoided them altogether? Could Nationalists have channelled their initial advantage, in terms of occupying the moral high ground in the face of Stormont’s aggression towards them, into real political influence, rather than allowing the civil rights effort to dissipate, superseded, as it was, by violence? Ultimately, however, I am concerned with the approach taken by successive British governments, partic